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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to update and supplement the com-
prehensive review of the federal black lung program published in
* Partner, Jackson & Kelly, Charleston, West Virginia. B.A., West Virginia University, 1977;
J.D., West Virginia University, 1980.
Mr. Prunty is the administrative manager of the federal black lung division at Jackson & Kelly.
** Partner, Arter & Hadden, Washington, D.C.; B.A., University of Rochester, 1967; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1970; L.L.M., George Washington University, 1973.
Mr. Solomons served as appellate counsel to the Department of Labor's coal mine workers'
compensation program from 1973 through 1978 and as legislative counsel for the Department of Labor
from 1978 through 1980.
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the 1989 National Coal Issue.1 During the past year, several United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals have addressed: (1) the scope of
interim presumption rebuttal in Department of Labor (DOL) claims
filed before April 1, 1980;2 (2) the burden of proof for establishing
entitlement in claims filed after March 31, 1980;3 and (3) broadening
the definition of "coal mine employment" under the federal black
lung program. 4 These decisions and other significant issues in black
lung litigation are discussed below.
II. ELIGIBILITY CRImEIu FOR DOL CLABs FILED
BEFORE APIL 1, 1980
It was hoped by everyone involved-United States Department
of Labor (DOL), claimants and employers-that the Supreme Court's
decision in Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben5 would resolve the un-
certainty which has plagued the DOL interim presumption6 through-
out the 1980's. 7 While Pittston Coal Group completes the
presumption invocation puzzle, 8 it does not supply any of the pieces
missing from the presumption rebuttal puzzle; it is still not settled
what evidence can be asserted to rebut the DOL interim presump-
1. Prunty & Solomons, The Federal Black Lung Program: Its Evolution and Current Issues,
91 W. VA. L. REV. 665 (1989).
2. See id. at 684-700 for a discussion of the DOL interim presumption, 20 C.F.R. § 727.203
(1989).
3. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 700-13 for a discussion of the eligibility criteria
for claims filed after March 31, 1980.
4. "Coal mine employment" is defined at 30 U.S.C. §§ 902(d), 802(h) (1982). See Prunty &
Solomons, supra note 1, at 713-17 for a discussion of coal mine employment issues.
5. 109 S. Ct. 414 (1988). See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 687-91, 699-700 for a
discussion of Pittston Coal Group.
6. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (1989).
7. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 677-700 for a discussion of the DOL interim
presumption and the Social Security Administration's interim presumption, 20 C.F.R. § 410.490 (1989).
See also Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History Surrounding the Black Lung Interim
Presumption and a Survey of Its Unresolved Issues, 83 W. VA. L. Ray. 869 (1981).
8. It is now well-settled that a preponderance of relevant evidence is necessary in order to
invoke the DOL interim presumption under any one of the five subsections at 20 C.F.R. section
727.203(a). Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 108 S. Ct.
427 (1987). A miner with less than ten years of coal mine employment may invoke the presumption
by proving the existence of pneumoconiosis and proving that the pneumoconiosis is related to coal
mine employment. Pittston Coal Group, 109 S. Ct. at 419-20 (striking the ten year requirement under
section 727.203(a) because it was not necessary for invocation of the section 410.490 interim pre-
sumption by a claimant who proved the existence of pneumoconiosis by x-ray, biopsy or autopsy
and established that the pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment).
2
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tion. The Court did not address the issue of what evidence will rebut
the DOL interim presumption because the respondents in Pittston
Coal Group conceded the validity of the DOL rebuttal criteria. 9 This
concession did not, however, bring to an end the confusion regarding
what proof can be asserted to rebut the DOL interim presumption.
Soon after it decided Pittston Coal Group, the Supreme Court
remanded a case to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit for consideration in accordance with Pittston Coal
Group. This case, Taylor v. Peabody Coal Co.,'0 addressed the va-
lidity of rebuttal rules under section 727.203(b). After declining re-
quests by the employer and DOL to re-brief the case in light of
Pittston Coal Group, the Seventh Circuit issued a decision on re-
mand in Peabody Coal Co. on August 28, 1989. The Seventh Circuit
held that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Pittston Coal Group
effectively invalidated the invocation and rebuttal provisions of sec-
tion 727.203.11
In its decision on rehearing, the Seventh Circuit rejected the re-
quest for en banc review of Peabody Coal Co., and explained its
earlier holding:
We held that to the extent the Department of Labor regulations allow rebuttal-
when HEW's do not-the Labor rules are invalid. We did not hold that there
is no conceivable circumstances under which HEW rules might allow medical
rebuttal.
2
An appeal from this holding to the Supreme Court has been
filed, relying in part on holdings from the Third and Sixth Circuit
Courts that the decision in Pittston Coal Group does not affect the
rebuttal provisions of section 727.203(b)."3
9. See Pittston Coal Group, 109 S. Ct. at 422-23.
10. 838 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 548 (1988).
11. Taylor v. Peabody Coal Co., 892 F.2d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed,
No. 89-1596 (U.S. 1990). In particular, the Seventh Circuit held that medical evidence could not be
considered in an interim presumption rebuttal inquiry. But see Meyer v. Zeigler Coal Co. 894 F.2d
902 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming an administrative law judge's finding of rebuttal under 20 C.F.R. §
727.203(b)(2) following a resolution of conflicting medical evidence), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-
7383 (U.S. 1990).
12. Peabody Coal Company, No. 86-2590, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Feb. 1, 1990).
13. BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, and John
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was the first circuit
court to address DOL interim presumption rebuttal after the Su-
preme Court's decision in Pittston Coal Group. In Youghiogheny
& Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken,'14 the Sixth Circuit rejected the ar-
gument that the Part 727 rebuttal provisions "are more restrictive
than their HEW Part 410 predecessors because the former allows
more evidence to be considered for purposes of rebutting the interim
presumption than the latter."' 15 The court held that neither its prior
decision in Kyle v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams, 6 nor the Supreme Court's decision in Pittston Coal Group
require consideration of DOL interim presumption claims under the
Part 410 rebuttal provisions. 17
The Seventh Circuit, in its decision on remand in Peabody Coal
Co., expressly rejected the Sixth Circuit decision in Milliken, and
held that a "valid distinction" between DOL's invocation and re-
buttal rules cannot be made consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Pittston Coal Group.'8
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Bethenergy Mines,
Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs & John
Pauley,9 held that an administrative law judge cannot apply the Part
410 rebuttal provisions to award benefits in a DOL claim where the
evidence proves that the miner's total disability is unrelated to coal
mine employment.20 The court observed that it could affirm the ben-
efit award to the claimant 2' only by finding that even if the employer
should prevail based on the law and the facts, benefits must be
14. 866 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1989).
15. Id. at 199.
16. 819 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1987) (requiring application of the HEW Part 410 invocation criteria
in claims which fail to qualify for invocation of the DOL interim presumption).
17. 866 F.2d at 199, 202 n.l. The Sixth Circuit noted that Congress clearly directed that all
relevant evidence be considered in adjudicating DOL interim presumption claims. Id. at 202 n.3. But
see Neace v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 867 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1989)
(remanding a Part 727 denial for reconsideration under the Part 410 interim presumption).
18. 892 F.2d at 505.
19. 890 F.2d 1295 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding rebuttal of the interim presumption under section
727.203(b)(3)), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-1714 (U.S. 1990).
20. Id. at 1302.
21. Mr. Pauley was disabled by several medical problems, including arthritis, pulmonary disease,
and residuals of a stroke. Id. at 1296.
[Vol. 92
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awarded "by reason of the presumptions and limitations on re-
buttal. '"22 The court declined "to reach such an unjust result.''23
Accordingly, the court held that while the presumption invocation
provisions of section 727.203(a) cannot be more restrictive than the
invocation criteria at section 410.490, the rebuttal rules of section
727.203(b) are not subject to the "not more restrictive than" lan-
guage of section 402(f)(2) of the Black Lung Act.2
The Pauley court recognized that the DOL interim presumption
provides for rebuttal with evidence that the miner (1) does not have
pneumoconiosis or (2) is not disabled in whole or in part as a result
of his occupational exposure, while the interim presumption at sec-
tion 410.490 does not contain expressly comparable provisions. 2 The
court had no trouble approving the availability of additional rebuttal
alternatives under the DOL interim presumption: "[E]ven though
the Benefits Act has a remedial purpose, it seems perfectly evident
that no set of regulations under [the Act] may provide that a claim-
ant who is statutorily barred from recovery may nonetheless re-
cover." ' 26 The court recognized the obvious: a black lung claim must
be denied if it is proven that the compensable disability is not present
(i.e., the miner does not have pneumoconiosis or is not disabled in
whole or in part because of his occupational exposure).
The Pauley court found that the reference to section
410.412(a)(1) 27 in the section 410.490 interim presumption demon-
strates an intention "to permit rebuttal by a showing that the clai-
mant's disability did not arise at least in part from coal mine
employment. ' 28 Finally, the court noted that its decision to limit
22. Id. at 1300.
23. Id.
24. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2). The Supreme Court in Pittston Coal Group relied on this provision
to invalidate the invocation rules of section 727.203(a). Pittston Coal Group, 109 S. Ct. at 424.
25. Pauley, 890 F.2d at 1298.
26. Id. at 1300 (citation omitted).
27. Section 410.412 is entitled 'Total disability' defined." Subsection (a)(1) of this regulation
states that a miner cannot be considered totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis unless "[h]is pneu-
moconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful work in the immediate area of his residence requiring
the skills and abilities comparable to those of any work in a mine or mines in which he previously
engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time." 20 C.F.R. § 410.412(a)(1) (1989)
(emphasis added).
28. Pauley, 890 F.2d at 1302.
1990]
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the holding of Pittston Coal Group to the invocation criteria of the
DOL interim presumption eliminates possible due process problems
resulting from a contrary result.29 These due process problems are
bottomed on two propositions: (1) that it is improper to limit the
evidence with which an operator may rebut the interim presump-
tion;3o and (2) prohibiting interim presumption rebuttal by proving
the absence of pneumoconiosis or the absence of any relationship
between total disability and occupational exposure makes the pre-
sumption so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary and thereby un-
constitutional. 31
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has followed
the Seventh Circuit's rationale in Peabody Coal Co. and invalidated
subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) of the DOL interim presumption. In
Taylor v. Clinchfield Coal Co.,32 the Fourth Circuit held:
[t]he rebuttal provisions of § 727.203(b)(3) and (4) allow the consideration of
evidence disputing both the presence of pneumoconiosis and the connection be-
tween total disability and coal mine employment. As rebuttal under § 727.203
permits additional criteria by which more elements statutory entitlement may be
rebutted, the provisions are more restrictive than those found at § 410.490 and
their application violates 30 U.S.C. § 902(0.
31
The decision in Clinchfield Coal Co. included a dissenting opin-
ion by Chief Judge Ervin. Judge Ervin noted the split between the
circuits and stated: "[tjo preclude rebuttal with evidence that the
miner either does not have pneumoconiosis or that his total disability
did not arise out of coal mine employment is unacceptable to me."
' 34
29. Id. at 1300 n.7.
30. The Supreme Court relied on the absence of any limitations of an employer's right to submit
relevant rebuttal evidence in upholding the constitutionality of the Part C rebuttable presumptions
applicable to DOL claims. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1976).
31. Presumptions pass constitutional muster if there is "some rational connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed." Mullins Coal, 108 S. Ct. at 440 n.32 (quoting Mobile,
Jackson & K. C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910)). The constitutionality of the invocation
provisions at section 727.203(a) is suspect, but the constitutionality of the DOL interim presumption
is preserved by the rebuttal provisions which require the consideration of all relevant evidence and
provide for presumption rebuttal by disproving any of the presumed facts. See Solomons, supra note
7, at 880-83, 885-86, 899-900.
32. 895 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1990).
33. Id. at 182-83.
34. Id. at 184.
6
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The apparent imprudence of both the Peabody Coal Co. and
Clinchfield Coal Co. decisions is vividly demonstrated in a Fourth
Circuit decision issued concurrently with Clinchfield Coal Co. In
Dayton v. Consolidation Coal Co., 5 the Fourth Circuit held that
an administrative law judge's decision to deny benefits because the
employer had proven that the claimant does not have coal workers'
pneumoconiosis, under section 727.203(b)(4), "is superfluous and
has no bearing on the case." ' 36 Clinchfield Coal Co. and Dayton
will most likely be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Several thousand DOL interim presumption claims remain in lit-
igation, even though the last day for filing a claim under section
727.203 was March 31, 1980.37 It is unfortunate and, for most em-
ployers, bewildering that ten years after the last day for filing a
DOL interim presumption claim it is still not clear what proof is
sufficient to establish whether a claimant is or is not entitled to
benefits .38
Much of the delay in the development of settled, uniformly ap-
plied rules for interim presumption rebuttal can be attributed to the
clash of principles and objectives that dictated the course of the
federal black lung program in its early years. Contributing to this
delay were the differing and as yet unsettled interpretations of var-
ious portions of section 727.203. 39
III. ELIGIEBILITY CRrrERIA FOR CLAims FiLEs
AFTIER MARCH 31, 1980
A. Circuit Court Decisions
The most significant entitlement issue under the DOL permanent
regulations40 is the question of disability causation: how much dis-
35. 895 F.2d 173 (4th Cir. 1990).
36. Id. at 176 n.l.
37. The DOL's permanent criteria became effective on April 1, 1980. 20 C.F.R. § 718.2 (1989).
More than 250,000 claims have been processed under the DOL interim regulations. U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, MIS # 11 (Sept. 30, 1989).
38. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 691-700 for a discussion of the evolution of the
burden of proof for rebuttal of the interim presumption under section 727.203(b).
39. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 667-72, 733, 734.
40. 20 C.F.R. § 718.1-404 (1989).
1990]
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ability due to coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP) must a claimant
prove in order to establish entitlement under the Black Lung Act?
The Benefits Review Board (BRB) first addressed this issue in a 1988
decision, Wilburn v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs,41 and held that CWP is compensable under the Black
Lung Act only if it "is in and of itself, totally disabling. ' 42 The
BRB in Wilburn cited to several of its earlier decisions and language
in the Federal Register for authority to support its rule.
In Bonessa v. United States Steel Corp.,43 the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected the BRB ruling in Wilburn and adopted a less
restrictive rule for proving total disability due to pneumoconiosis.
The court explored the "authority" relied on by the BRB to support
the "in and of itself" rule, rejected this authority as not supportive
of the Wilburn holding, and declared that "[t]he Wilburn decision
appears to be the genesis of this interpretation of the regulation."
44
The Bonessa court reviewed and distinguished each of the cases
cited in Wilburn, noting that none of these decisions embraced the
"in and of itself" rule. The Federal Register language cited by the
BRB to support the Wilburn rule provides, in relevant part, that
"a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment shall not
by itself be sufficient to establish that the miner's impairment is due
to pneumoconiosis. ' 45 The Bonessa court observed that this com-
ment neither stated nor inferred that a miner's total disability must
be due solely to pneumoconiosis. Instead, the court interpreted this
caveat as "a common sense statement that the disability must be
due to pneumoconiosis and not solely to some other respiratory
impairment. This is a necessary corollary to the statute's purpose
to assist those claimants who become disabled from coal mine em-
ployment. "46
41. 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-135 (1988). The BRB's holding in Wilburn was clearly presaged
in earlier rulings. See, e.g., Gessner v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, I I
Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-1 (1987).
42. Wilburn, 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB), at 1-138.
43. 884 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 733.
45. Id. at 732 (quoting 48 Fed. Reg. 24,275 (1983)).
46. Id. at 733 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1982)).
[Vol. 92
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Bonessa adopted a rule which provides for compensation so long
as CWP "is a substantial contributor to the disability." 47 The court
adopted this rule in order to be consistent with the burden of proof
for establishing entitlement to benefits for death due to CWP:
We can perceive no reason why the phrase 'total disability due to pneumoconiosis'
should not track the phrase 'death due to pneumoconiosis' which encompasses
the situation where pneumoconiosis was a substantial contributor to that death
and, thus permit recovery for benefits when pneumoconiosis is a significant con-
tributor to a living miner's disability.'
3
The Eleventh Circuit has also adopted the "substantial contrib-
utor" rule.49
Three weeks after the Third Circuit issued its decision in Bonessa,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in
Adams v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs.0
The Adams court apparently was not advised of the Bonessa de-
cision, as the court's opinion does not even mention Bonessa. Like
the Third Circuit, however, the Sixth Circuit held that the Wilburn
rule "is an unduly restrictive reading of the statutory and regulatory
language 'total disability due to pneumoconiosis' ..... ,5
The Adams court surveyed the law relevant to the issue of dis-
ability causation under the Social Security Administration (SSA) rules
for Part B claims and the DOL interim presumption. The SSA re-
gulations require that pneumoconiosis be "the primary reason" for
total disability, 2 while the DOL interim presumption compensates
CWP, real or presumed, unless it is proven that a miner's total
disability was not caused in whole or in part by pneumoconiosis.5 1
The court reasoned that both of these "lesser" standards undermine
the Wilburn rule.5 4 The court further noted that the remedial nature
47. Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 733.
49. Lollar v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258 (11th Cir. 1990). See infra notes 65-
66 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lollar.
50. 886 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1989).
51. Id. at 819.
52. 20 C.F.R. § 410.426(a) (1989).
53. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3), as interpreted by Gibas v. Saginaw Mining Co., 748 F.2d 1112
(6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985).
54. Adams, 886 F.2d at 824-25.
1990]
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of the federal black lung program is inconsistent with the Wilburn
rule. 5 Having found the Wilburn rule "undermined" and "sub-
verted" by these considerations, the Sixth Circuit was guided by its
prior interpretation of the burden of proof for rebuttal of the interim
presumption under section 727.203(b)(3).
In the Sixth Circuit, therefore, entitlement under the current Part
718 regulations is established by proving the existence of a totally
disabling respiratory impairment "due 'at least in part' to... pneu-
moconiosis." 5 6 The court reasoned that this was an appropriate stan-
dard for disability causation since it was consistent with the burden
of proof for establishing a causal relationship between pneumoco-
niosis and coal mine employment: section 718.203 requires that be-
fore a claim can be awarded, it must be proven that the miner's
pneumoconiosis was due at least in part to coal mine employment. 7
The court further noted that under Part 718, the burden of per-
suasion remains with the claimant to establish that dust exposure
contributes to any totally disabling lung condition. 8
The first court of appeals to address the issue of disability cau-
sation under the Part 718 regulations was the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit. In Mangus v. Director, Office of Workers' Com-
pensation Programs,59 the Tenth Circuit specifically rejected a cau-
sation rule which requires the claimant to prove that pneumoconiosis
is a "significant" or "substantial" cause of total disability 0 The
court declared that the appropriate standard for disability causation
under section "718.204(a) is as follows: if the pneumoconiosis is at
least a contributing cause, there is a sufficient nexus between the
55. Id.
56. Id. The court noted, however, that since there was no evidence that Mr. Adams' pneu-
moconiosis "played only an infinitesimal or de minimus part in his totally disabling respiratory im-
pairment" it was not necessary to determine whether such evidence would support a finding of
nonentitlement. Id. at 826 n.11. This statement obviously leaves open the door for additional inter-
pretation of the standard.
57. 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(a) (1989). See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the two different burdens of proof for establishing the existence of CWP.
58. Adams, 886 F.2d at 825.
59. 882 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1989).
60. Id. at 1530-31.
[Vol. 92
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pneumoconiosis and the total disability to satisfy claimant's burden
of proof."1
6'
The Tenth Circuit justified its decision in Mangus by pointing
to (1) the remedial nature of the federal black lung program; (2)
the "at least in part" requirement for establishing a causal nexus
between coal mine employment and pneumoconiosis; 62 (3) previous
judicial interpretations of the causation standard under other re-
gulations, such as section 727.203(b)(3) and earlier versions of the
Act; 6 and (4) the absence of "clear language in the 1981 amend-
ments or guidance from their legislative history directing us to re-
quire a heightened causal relationship between a claimant's
pneumoconiosis and his or her total disability. ' 64
Significantly, the Tenth Circuit in Mangus expressly rejects the
"substantial contributor" causation standard formulated by the Third
Circuit in the more recent Bonessa opinion. Furthermore, both Bo-
nessa and the Sixth Circuit in Adams require the existence of a
totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment; it is not clear
whether or not Mangus imposes the same requirement. While Mr.
Mangus was disabled because of a lung condition (i.e., lung cancer),
the Tenth Circuit's decision does not expressly limit entitlement to
cases of respiratory disability. Mangus may be construed to mean
that total disability due to any cause(s) is compensable under the
Black Lung Act so long as the disability is due at least in part to
CWP.
In any event, there exists a split of authority between the Tenth
Circuit, on the one hand, and Third and Eleventh65 Circuits, on the
61. Id. at 1531-32.
62. See infra notes 87-92 for a discussion of the two different burdens of proof for establishing
the existence of CWP.
63. Mangus, 882 F.2d at 1529. The Part 718 regulations do not contain language comparable
to the "in whole or in part" language found at section 727.203(b)(3). See Adams, 886 F.2d at 824;
Bonessa, 884 F.2d at 720; see also Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 695-98 for a discussion of
the evolution of section 727.203(b)(3).
64. Mangus, 882 F.2d at 1532. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text for a discussion
of relevant legislative history.
65. In one of the most recent decisions to address the issue of disability causation in current
Part 718 claims, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the decisions in Mangus, Bonessa,
and Adams. Lollar v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258 (11th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh
1990]
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other, regarding the meaning of disability due to pneumoconiosis
in claims filed after March 31, 1980. Arguably, a split also exists
between the Sixth Circuit and the Third and Eleventh Circuits on
the issue of disability causation. Depending upon the facts in any
given case, the substantial contributor test adopted by the Third and
Eleventh Circuits may not be any different than the Sixth Circuit's
"in part" test. A contribution that is not significant from the Third
and Eleventh Circuits' point of view may well be de minimis under
the Sixth Circuit's standard or not a necessary contributing cause
under the Seventh Circuit's rule.66
Since the relevant decisions do not discuss or even acknowledge
the other, except for the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lollar v.
Alabama By-Products Corp.,67 it remains to be seen how this ap-
parent split will be resolved, or whether it can be resolved, without
an appeal to the Supreme Court.
As noted by the Third Circuit, the disability causation issue pres-
ents the only opportunity for judicial interpretation of the entitle-
ment inquiry under the current 718 regulations. The regulations and/
or the Black Lung Act provide definitions for "pneumoconiosis ' 68
and "total disability."' 69 On the other hand, neither Congress nor
the Secretary of Labor have defined what is meant by the require-
Circuit agreed that the Wilbum standard for disability causation "is unduly stringent," and adopted
the substantial contributor rule defined by the Third Circuit in Bonessa. Id. at 1265. The court rejected
the decision in Mangus, to the extent it "declined to require a 'significant' or 'substantial' causal
link." Id. The Seventh Circuit, in the most recent decision to address this issue, has held that CWP
must be a "necessary contributing cause" to total disability due to a pulmonary or respiratory im-
pairment in order to be compensable. Shelton v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams, 899 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1990).
66. Regarding the Sixth Circuit's Adams decision, the Eleventh Circuit observed "that the Sixth
Circuit . . .. while not using the terms 'substantial' or 'significant' in its standard, was careful to
observe that '[niothing in this record suggests that Adams' pneumoconiosis played an infinitesimal
or de minim[i]s part in his totally disabling respiratory impairment, so we need not consider here
whether such a finding ... would support a denial of benefits under the Act."' Lollar, 893 F.2d at
1265 (citation omitted). The authors agree with the Eleventh Circuit's observation that the Adams
decision is not necessarily inconsistent with the substantial contributor rule; the same also may be
said about the Seventh Circuit's "necessary contributor" rule. See supra note 65.
67. 893 F.2d 1258 (lth Cir. 1990).
68. 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.101-203 (1989); 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(20) (1989).
69. 30 U.S.C. § 902(0(1) (1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.204, 725.101(21) (1989).
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ment that benefits be paid only upon proof of total disability "due
to" pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment.
70
The circuits which have addressed the "due to pneumoconiosis"
standard have sought to resolve this issue by searching for analogous
principles in other rules and judicial decisions. The Sixth Circuit
adopted the "at least in part" rule in order "to impose parallel
causation requirements on the relationship between pneumoconiosis
and coal mine employment and the relationship between total dis-
ability and pneumoconiosis." 71 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit adopted
the "at least in part" rule because it is the same standard for proving
a causation relationship between coal mine employment and pneu-
moconiosis under section 718.203(a). The authors suggest that the
rationale adopted by the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, in Adams and
Mangus respectively, is tenuous at best.
72
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, declined to rely on the
disease causation standard under section 718.203(a) and, relying on
the Third Circuit decision in Bonessa, adopted the substantial con-
tributor rule for disability causation. 73 The Third Circuit adopted
the substantial contributor rule because it is identical to the rule
imposed on claimants seeking benefits for death due to pneumo-
coniosis.
The decision by the Third and Eleventh Circuits to maintain
consistent burdens of proof for both living miner claims and survivor
claims promotes fairness in claims adjudication. Moreover, it seems
that the legislative history is reasonably consistent with the Third
and Eleventh Circuits' decisions. By the same token, the BRB's hold-
ing in Wilburn, arguably, can be supported by the plain language
of the statute74 and the clear direction of the 1981 amendments to
the Black Lung Act: that DOL tighten the eligibility criteria under
Part 718.75
70. See 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1982). But see infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text discussing
relevant legislative history.
71. Adams, 886 F.2d at 825.
72. See infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
73. Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1263-65.
74. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 902(f)(1)(d) (1982).
75. See generally Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 700-13.
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B. Legislative History
There is relevant legislative history addressing what is meant by
disability "due to" pneumoconiosis in the Senate Report which ac-
companied the bill eventually adopted as the 1977 Black Lung Ben-
efits Reform Act. This report states that "[ilt is ... intended that
traditional workers' compensation principles such as those, for ex-
ample, which permit a finding of eligibility where the totally dis-
abling condition was significantly related to or aggravated by the
occupational exposure be included in the regulations. ' 76 The sub-
stantial contributor rule seems to be more consistent with this leg-
islative history than the "at least in part" standard adopted by the
Sixth and Tenth Circuits.
The Tenth Circuit, in explaining why it adopted the "at least in
part" rule, observed that "[tihere is not clear language in the 1981
Amendments or guidance from their Legislative history directing us
to require a heightened causal relationship between a claimant's
pneumoconiosis and his or her total disability." ' 77 This statement is
inconsistent with the clear purpose of the 1981 amendments .78
As noted by Dr. Peter Barth, "[t]he character of the Black Lung
Act was changed considerably by the amendments passed in 1981
76. S. REP. No. 209, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 13-14 (1977), reprinted in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM.
ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess., BLACK LUNG BENEFITs REFORM ACT AND BLACK
LUNG BENEFITS REvENUE ACT OF 1977, 616-17 (Comm. Print 1979). This legislative history was relied
upon by the BRB in adopting the "significant relationship" test for interim presumption rebuttal
under section 727.203(b)(3). See Shaw v. Bradford Coal Co., 7 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-462 (1984),
rev'd, Borgeson v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 12 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-169 (1989) (en banc). This history
was also cited by the Third and Four Circuits in defining the scope of (b)(3) rebuttal under the DOL
interim presumption. Carozza v. United States Steel Corp., 727 F.2d 74, 78 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984);
Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Massey, 736 F.2d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1984). The Fourth Circuit in Massey
cited this legislative history as specific evidence "indicating that Congress considered and approved
of a proof scheme allowing miners to recover even if pneumoconiosis did not in and of itself cause
their total disability . . . ." Id. at 124.
77. Mangus, 882 F.2d at 1531.
78. Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, Title II, 95 Stat. 1643
(1981). The very purpose of the Part 718 permanent criteria, even before passage of the 1981 amend-
ments, was to end the reign of the interim presumption, pursuant to express Congressional direction
that DOL design scientifically correct and fair eligibility criteria. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1)(D) (1982).
Inasmuch as Congress wanted and expected more restrictive criteria in the Part 718 rules, and in view
of the plain fact that DOL abandoned the "in part" disability causation standard in Part 718 after
having used it in the rebuttal provisions of the DOL interim presumption, no traditional rule of
construction supports the judicial re-insertion of the obviously abandoned "in part" standard.
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... . At the very least, the series of steps taken to liberalize the
law after 1969 were set back." ' 79 The 1981 amendments were intended
in part to resolve the insolvency of the Black Lung Disability Trust
Fund (BLDTF), which had operated at a deficit "since its inception
in 1978.''80 In order to achieve this objective, the amendments: 1)
doubled the excise tax on coal dedicated to funding the BLDTF; 2)
increased the interest paid by responsible operators in reimbursing
the BLDTF for interim benefits paid to claimants pending litigation;
3) ended the BLDTF's practice of paying retroactive benefits during
claim litigation; 4) changed the formula for calculating benefits; and
5) eliminated five special provisions previously enacted in order to
liberalize the federal black lung program at a time when "medical
diagnoses were inadequate or not widely available, and poor medical
and death records kept."'8 Regarding these five provisions previously
enacted to liberalize the program, Congress observed in 1981 that
"[tihere [was] no longer sufficient reason to keep these rules in
place."
8 2
The five liberalizing rules eliminated by the 1981 amendments
were: (1) the fifteen-year respiratory disability presumption; (2) the
ten-year respiratory disease death presumption; (3) the twenty-five
year death presumption, (4) the restriction on the DOL's authority
to have x-rays reread by experts certified as "B-readers" for oc-
cupational pneumoconiosis; and (5) the provision allowing for the
approval of survivor claims based on a showing of total disability
due to CWP.83 Senator Orrin Hatch, summarizing the 1981 amend-
ments, made the following statement:
79. P. BRTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG COAL AND FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR OCCU-
PATIONAL DisEAsE 255 (1987); see also J. NELSON, BLACK LUNG: A STUDY OF DisABarr COMPENSATION
PoLicY FORMATION 148-53 (1985). "The 1981 Legislation was designed to stop the excess fostered by
three prior black lung statutes." Lopatto, The Federal Black Lung Program: A 1983 Primer, 85 W.
VA. L. REv. 678 (1983).
80. SUBCo~mrTE ON OvEisGHT OF THE HousE Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97th Cong.,
Ist Sess., THE INSOLVENCY PROBLEMS OF Tm BLACK LUNG DisAmuTY TRUST FUND V (Comm. Print
1981) (hereinafter SuBcomMIrEE REPORT). For discussion of the development of the 1981 amendments,
see P. BA TH, supra note 79 at 255-62; Lopatto, supra note 78, at 695-702; Prunty & Solomons,
supra note 1, at 710-13.
81. EXPLANATION OF BLACK LUNG AMENDMENTS OF 1981, reprinted in 127 CONG. REc. 31,747
(Dec. 16, 1981).
82. Id.
83. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 711-12 for a discussion of the specific amendments.
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The Bill also addresses what many regard is the underlying reason for the trust
fund's insolvency-namely, the eligibility criteria. This without question has evoked
tremendous controversy. Many have contended that the current criteria are simply
too loose and that thousands of claimants who are not truly disabled have received
benefits. Recent studies by the General Accounting Office have tended to confirm
this. In 1980, GAO reported that 88 percent of claims approved by the Social
Security Administration were based on inadequate or conflicting medical evidence.
This year, GAO has reported that its survey of DOL-approved claims revealed
84% of the cases were based on inadequate or conflicting medical evidence.
However, it is always easier to state the problem than to achieve a complete
solution. The Bill, as developed under the guidance of the Department of Labor,
reflects a consensus among the interested parties of what.eligibility changes are
needed to begin restoring this as a disability program, and no longer a pension
program."
By eliminating the fifteen-year respirable disease presumption,
Congress shifted the burden of proof on the issue of disability due
to pneumoconiosis from the employers of long-term coal miners to
the claimant. 85 Adoption of an "at least in part" standard for dis-
ability causation essentially reinstates a rebuttable presumption of
disability causation for miners who have simple pneumoconiosis and
are disabled by a lung impairment. In these cases,8 6 the miner ben-
efits from an essentially irrebuttable presumption of disability due
to pneumoconiosis because medical experts are usually unwilling to
state with any medical certainty that a diagnosed lung disease (e.g.,
coal workers' pneumoconiosis) does not contribute something to the
creation of the miner's total disability.
See also Lopatto, supra note 78, at 677-78, 694-702. Regarding survivor claims, benefits were limited
to claims where it is proven that death was due to pneumoconiosis. Furthermore, the amendments
prohibited the award of survivor claims based upon affidavits from persons eligible to share in the
benefits award.
84. 127 CoNo. REc. 31,977-78 (Dec. 16, 1981) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
85. Under the DOL interim presumption, miners with at least ten years of coal mine employment
and proof of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment are entitled to a presumption
of disability due to pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(4) (1989); see also id. §§ 727.203(a)(2),(3)
(providing for a presumption of entitlement based on certain lung function test results). Under the
DOL's permanent criteria in effect prior to the 1981 amendments, a miner disabled by a pulmonary
or respiratory impairment was entitled to a presumption of disability due to pneumoconiosis upon
proof at least fifteen years of underground coal mine employment. 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(a) (1989).
These regulatory presumptions can be traced to section 411(c)(4) of the Black Lung Act, 30 U.S.C.
921(c)(4) (1982). See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 702 n.194 (regarding the use of surface
coal mine employment to invoke the fifteen-year presumption).
86. See infra note 97 for an example of this type of case.
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C. Analysis Of The "Due To" Requirement
As noted by the Third Circuit in Bonessa, the substantial con-
tributor rule interprets the burden of proving total disability due to
pneumoconiosis consistent with the burden of proof imposed on
claimants seeking benefits for death due to pneumoconiosis. The
substantial contributor rule also is consistent with the causation el-
ement of the definition of compensable pneumoconiosis, as this def-
inition relates to pulmonary and respiratory impairment 87 not due
to "'clinical pneumoconiosis.' ' 88 In order for a lung condition other
than clinical pneumoconiosis to be compensable under the Act (i.e.,
to qualify as legal coal workers' pneumoconiosis), it must be "sig-
nificantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure
in coal mine employment. ' 89 Clinical pneumoconiosis, on the other
hand, is compensable so long as it "arose at least in part out of
coal mine employment." 90
87. The term "impairment" means only "an alteration of an individual's health status that is
assessed by medical means." A mEacAN MEDICAL Ass'N, GuiEs TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT
IMPAIRmENT 2 (3d ed. 1988). This definition must be distinguished from the meaning of "disability",
which is the "alteration of an individual's capacity to meet personal, social, or occupational demands,
or to meet statutory or regulatory requirements." Id.
88. Clinical pneumoconiosis is a condition characterized by (i) permanent deposition of sub-
stantial amounts of particulate matter in the lungs, usually of occupational or environmental origin,
and (ii) tissue reaction to its presence. DoRLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DIcTIoNARY 1220 (25th ed.
1974). Examples of occupational pneumoconiosis include asbestosis, silicosis, siderosis, (pneumoco-
niosis due to the inhalation of iron particles, usually seen in welders), byssinosis (pneumoconiosis
caused by the inhalation of cotton dust), and the medical disease of CWP. In order for clinical
pneumoconiosis to qualify as coal workers' pneumoconiosis under the federal black lung program,
a claimant must prove that the pneumoconiosis arose at least in part out of coal mine employment.
20 C.F.R. § 718.203(a) (1989). If a miner with clinical pneumoconiosis establishes at least ten years
of coal mine employment, there is a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of
coal mine employment. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1) (1989); 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(b).
89. The definition of pneumoconiosis for purposes of the federal black lung program is:
a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary
impairments, arising out of coal mine employment. This definition includes, but is not
limited to, coal workers' pneumoconiosis, and anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, anthrosilicosis,
massive pulmonary fibrosis, progressive massive fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis, aris-
ing out of coal mine employment. For purposes of this definition, a disease 'arising out
of coal mine employment' includes any chronic pulmonary disease resulting in respiratory
or pulmonary impairment significantly relating to, or substantially aggravated by, dust ex-
posure in coal mine employment.
20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (1989).
90. Id. § 718.203(a).
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The Sixth Circuit, in Adams, recognized these alternative disease
causation standards 9 and elected to define the disability causation
standard consistent with the "at least in part" standard applicable
to claims where the existence of clinical pneumoconiosis is proven:
We therefore hold ... that in order to qualify for benefits under Part 718, a
miner who is found to suffer pneumoconiosis under section 718.202, must af-
firmatively establish that his total disabling respiratory impairment (as found un-
der section 718.204(c)) was due 'at least in part' to his pneumoconiosis.1
The Tenth Circuit adopted essentially the same rationale in Man-
gus.91 This interpretation of "disability due to pneumocoytiosis",
however, is not without its problems. First, the interpretation results
in a different burden of proof in claims based on alleged total dis-
ability due to pneumoconiosis than the burden of proof in claims
based on an allegation of death due to pneumoconiosis. Secondly,
a situation is created where miners with clinical pneumoconiosis and
a disabling lung impairment will receive benefits even though their
pneumoconiosis is not disabling in and of itself, and they would be
totally disabled even if they did not have CWP.9 4
It is difficult to justify a rule that imposes on widows and other
survivors a greater burden of proof than the burden of proof facing
miners seeking benefits for total disability due to black lung disease.
The burdens of proof should be equal, or the greater burden placed
on living miners who are available to undergo the various objective
tests necessary to confirm the severity of their lung impairment and
evaluate whether CWP causes or contributes to their disability. The
Third Circuit recognized this proposition when it declared:
We can perceive no reason why the phrase 'total disability due to pneumoconiosis'
should not track the phrase 'death due to pneumoconiosis' which encompasses
the situation where pneumoconiosis was a substantial contributor to that death
and thus, permit recovery for benefits when pneumoconiosis is a significant con-
tributor to a living miner's disability.91
91. Adams, 886 F.2d at 822-23 n.4.
92. Id. at 825.
93. Mangus, 882 F.2d at 1527.
94. See infra note 97.
95. Bonessa, 884 F.2d at 733.
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Neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Tenth Circuit has addressed this
issue in'their decisions adopting a lesser burden of proof for living
miner claims than that facing applicants in death claims. 96
That the "at least in part" standard for proving disability due
to CWP may result in the approval of claims where the contribution
by pneumoconiosis to the miner's disability is minimal and essen-
tially meaningless was acknowledged by the Sixth Circuit in Adams.97
The Sixth Circuit left the door open for a solution:
Nothing in this record suggests that Adams' pneumoconiosis has played only an
infintestimal or de mininimus part in his totally disabling respiratory impairment,
so we need not consider here whether such a finding, if supported by substantial
evidence, would support a denial of benefits under the Act.98
The substantial contributor standard for disability causation is
a reasonable rule. It is consistent with the legislative history ad-
dressing the issue; it is consistent with the burden of proof in sur-
vivor claims; and it is consistent with the burden of proof for disease
causation in claims where clinical pneumoconiosis is not proven. It
is also considerably less restrictive than the rule set forth by the
Social Security Administration in its permanent black lung regula-
tions, which requires that pneumoconiosis be the primary cause of
the miner's disability. 99
96. The Sixth Circuit cited to the burden of proof in death claims in order to demonstrate
that the relevant regulations do not define what is meant by total disability due to pneumoconiosis;
the court did not try to reconcile the burden of proof in death claims with its decision to adopt a
seemingly lesser burden of proof for living miner claims. See Adams, 886 F.2d at 824 n.7.
97. A good example of this type of case is one where the miner currently has simple CWP by
chest x-ray, primary lung cancer which is in and of itself totally disabling, and the doctors agree that
the lung cancer is due to a long history of tobacco abuse. In this hypothetical case, the objective
lung studies show that the claimant's pulmonary impairment prior to the development of lung cancer
was minimal, and was insufficient to prevent the miner from performing his usual coal mine work
or comparable and gainful work; the doctors agree that some part of this non-disabling impairment
can be attributed to simple CWP but most is the risult of cigarette smoking. This miner, with his
lung cancer and pre-existing lung impairment, part of which is due to CWP, is totally disabled by
his current lung dysfunction, some small part of which reasonably may be attributed to simple CWP.
This type of case could be approved under an "at least in part" standard for proving disability
causation, even though (I) the miner's CWP is not disabling, (2) the miner still would be totally
disabled if he did not have CWP, and (3) the miner would be fully able to work if he did not have
lung cancer.
98. Adams, 886 F.2d at 826 n.11 (emphasis added); see also Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1265.
99. 20 C.F.R. § 410.426(a) (1989).
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A lesser standard than the substantial contributor rule is, in these
authors' opinions, unreasonable because it results in a different bur-
den of proof for claimants seeking benefits for disability due to
pneumoconiosis than the burden placed on claimants seeking ben-
efits for death due to pneumoconiosis. Moreover, judicial appli-
cation of the "at least in part" standard in claims filed since January
1, 1982 seems to constitute judicial re-insertion of a rule previously
abandoned by DOL at the direction of Congress. t°° It may be that
this issue cannot be resolved without an appeal to the Supreme Court.
IV. IssuEs To WATCH
A. Coal Mine Employment Issues
1. Central Repair Shop Employment
The question whether work at a central repair shop located at
a site geographically removed from a coal mine or coal preparation
facility constitutes coal mine work under the Black Lung Act con-
tinues to generate a good deal of litigation. 0 1 There can be no serious
debate that the statutes which define coal mine employment impose
a geographical requirement that repair shop employment can qualify
as coal mine employment only when the shop is located on an actual
coal extraction site or at a coal preparation facility, or around or
in the area of an extraction site or coal preparation facility.10 2
It is easy to determine whether the first alternative is satisfied
(i.e., work at the actual geographic location of a coal extraction or
preparation site). The more difficult question is what facts and cir-
cumstances are necessary in order to establish that a repair shop is
located around or in the area of an extraction or preparation site.
It is not clear how far Congress intended this geographic limitation
to extend.
What is clear is that the old rule of excluding from the definition
of coal mine employment all jobs not performed within the actual
geographic boundaries of an extraction or preparation site is no
100. See supra notes 78 and 85-86 and accompanying text.
101. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 713-16.
102. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 802(h)(2), (i), 902(d) (1982).
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longer good law. Three circuit courts of appeals have expressly re-
jected this inflexible rule.103 DOL attorneys argue in favor of a func-
tion-based analysis which effectively eliminates any inquiry as to the
geographic "situs" of the job in question.104 Courts have rejected
this argument, retained the situs test, and held that the situs inquiry
involves a fact-dependent analysis by the administrative law judge. 05
It is difficult to articulate a situs test for coal mine employment
which encompasses all of the considerations expressed by the circuit
courts in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
Ziegler Coal Co.,'6 Baker v. United States Steel Corp.,107 and Di-
rector, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Consolidation
Coal Co. & William Petracca.0 8 The test which seems to emerge
from these decisions involves a step-by-step analysis of the evidence
of record.
First, the judge must inquire as to whether the employment in
question was in fact performed at an actual coal extraction or coal
preparation facility. If this question is answered in the affirmative,
the situs test is satisfied and the inquiry ends. If the question is
answered in the negative, the trier-of-fact must then review the rec-
ord for evidence that the work activity in question required frequent
contact with a coal extraction or coal preparation facility. If this
further inquiry results in an affirmative ruling, making it reasonable
to grant the claimant the benefit of the various presumptions of
dust exposure,/9 the situs test is satisfied.
If there is insufficient proof that the job in question involved
frequent contact with an extraction site or preparation facility, the
103. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Ziegler Coal Co., 853 F.2d 259
(7th Cir. 1989); Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 867 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1989); Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Consolidation Coal Co., 884 F.2d 926 (6th Cir. 1989); see
Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 714-16 (discussing the Ziegler Coal Co. and Baker decisions).
104. See Petracca, 884 F.2d at 930-32; Ziegler Coal Co., 853 F.2d at 834-36.
105. Ziegler Coal Co., 853 F.2d at 535; Baker, 867 F.2d at 1300; Petracca, 884 F.2d at 935.
106. 853 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1989).
107. 867 F.2d 1297 (l1th Cir. 1989).
108. 884 F.2d 926 (6th Cir. 1989).
109. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.202(a), .492(c), .493(a)(6) (1989); see also Zimmerman v. J. Robert
Balzey, Inc., 10 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-75 (1987) (discussing the evidence necessary to rebut these
presumptions of dust exposure).
1990]
21
Prunty and Solomons: Federal Black Lung Update
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
administrative law judge should next search the record for evidence
that those who work at the repair shop were regularly exposed to
significant quantities of coal mine dust.110 If this evidence is present,
the situs test may be satisfied without further investigation.
The Petracca court held, after reviewing the rationale in Ziegler
Coal Co. and Baker, that judges should presume that repair shop
employment is coal mine work if the evidence demonstrates that the
employer maintained the repair shop in the general vicinity of one
or more extraction sites or preparation facilities in order to minimize
the cost of transporting disabled equipment, reduce the turnaround
time for equipment repairs, and assure the availability of mechanics
who can be called to the extraction site or preparation facility on
short notice."'
Finally, an analysis of the factors relevant to determining whether
repair shop work constitutes coal mine employment must be resolved
with reference to the remedial nature of the Black Lung Act: all
reasonable doubt must be resolved to the benefit of the claimant." 2
Each of the factors set forth above were considered, in varying
degrees, in Ziegler Coal Co., Baker and Petracca. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has been asked to adopt the step-
by-step analysis outlined above in a case where the administrative
law judge resolved the central shop issue by dismissing the employer
and awarding benefits against the BLDTF."
3
110. See generally Ziegler Coal, 853 F.2d at 531-32, 535; Baker, 867 F.2d at 1298, 1300; Petracca,
884 F.2d at 932, 935. As noted in the concurring and dissenting opinion in Petracca, the physical
distance between a repair shop and a coal mine becomes less important as the possibility of harmful
dust exposure increases. Id. at 935 (Boggs, J., concurring and dissenting).
111. Petracca, 884 F.2d at 934-35.
112. See id. at 933-35.
113. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Consolidation Coal Co., No. 89-
1757 (4th Cir.) (argued Apr. 6, 1990). The administrative law judge in the Consolidation Coal Co.
case dismissed the employer and held that the BLDTF must pay benefits because DOL had determined
that the deceased miner was totally disabled by coal workers' pneumoconiosis. By so holding, the
judge did not have to-address complex medical issues litigated by the employer. The judge in Con-
solidation Coal Co. relied upon the old fixed-distance standard to dismiss the employer. If the court
of appeals vacates this determination, it will have to remand the claim not only for further consid-
eration of the coal mine employment issue but, if the employer is reinstated as a party, consideration
of the medical issues of entitlement. This could result in a finding of nonentitlement. The employer
in Consolidation Coal Co. has argued that such a result would be inconsistent with the decision in
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The BRB held in Roberson v. Norfolk & W. Ry.1 4 that railroads
are liable for federal black lung benefits so long as the employee
in question: (1) performed work which is integral to the process of
coal production and (2) spent a significant part of his employment
at a mine site or coal preparation facility.11 5 This decision could
increase dramatically the number of claims filed by railroad em-
ployees, including those workers involved in track maintenance and
railroad car repair. This case is now pending on appeal before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.1
6
3. Multiple Responsible Operators
The BRB held in Goddard v. Oglebay Norton Co.1 7 that a claim
may not be remanded to the deputy commissioner level for recon-
sideration of the naming of a responsible operator."8 According to
the BRB, the Secretary of Labor must identify all coal operators
who may be liable for the payment of benefits in the same pro-
ceeding which determines whether a miner is entitled to benefits." 9
"The regulations contain no express provision requiring the [DOL]
to identify all putative responsible operators, and resolve any dispute
as to which one is properly responsible for benefits, in one pro-
ceeding. We hold, however, that due process, as well as the efficient
administration of the Act, compels this result.'1
20
The BRB held that remand of a claim from the Office of Ad-
ministrative Law Judges for further consideration of the responsible
Baker, which suggests that the situs test should be applied in a manner which most benefits the
claimant's case. 867 F.2d at 1300. The employer has urged the court of appeals to construct a situs
test for repair shop employment which draws on the common elements of all three of the decisions
addressing this issue.
114. 13 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-6 (1989).
115. Id. at 1-8 to 1-10.
116. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Roberson, No. 89-2192 (4th Cir.) (argued Apr. 4, 1990).
117. 12 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-130 (1988), rev'd sub nom. Director, Office of Workers' Com-
pensation Programs v. Oglebay Norton Co., 877 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Crabtree v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 7 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-354 (1984).
118. Oglebay Norton Co., 12 Black Lung Rep. (MB) at 1-132.
119. Id. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.410, .412 (1989).
120. Crabtree, 7 Black Lung Rep. (MB) at 1-357 (footnote omitted).
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operator issue, simply because the DOL failed to name all potential
operators the first time around, "would be tantamount to relitigating
the claim.''2 According to the BRB, this would be unfair to the
claimant who had already established entitlement in the first round
of proceedings, because the claimant may lose his case in the next
round of adjudication against another operator. 22
Moreover, the BRB observed that "piecemeal litigation obviously
is not compatible with the efficient administration of the Act and
expeditious processing of claims.' 2  For these reasons, the BRB
interpreted section 725.412 as requiring DOL to either resolve the
responsible operator issue in a preliminary proceeding or proceed
against all potential responsible operators at every stage of claims
adjudication. DOL has selected the latter alternative, and routinely
names multiple responsible operators in cases where the miner worked
for more than one coal mine employer after December 31, 1969.
In the Oglebay Norton Co. appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the
BRB's interpretation of section 725.412 for two reasons. First, the
court observed that section 725.412 specifically permits identification
of a responsible operator at any time during the processing of a
claim.'24 Secondly, the court noted that the BRB is not a policy-
making agency and its interpretation of section 725.412, which in-
serts a time limitation for naming a responsible operator, is not
entitled to any particular deference. 25 "Rather, the Director's stat-
utory interpretation is the one entitled to judicial deference, since
he is the one charged with administration of the [Act].' 26
In spite of the Oglebay Norton Co. decision, it is still routine
for the DOL to name multiple responsible operators at the initial




124. Oglebay Norton Co., 877 F.2d at 1303.
125. Id. at 1304.
126. Id. (quoting Saginaw Mining Co. v. Mazzulli, 818 F.2d 1278, 1283 (6th Cir. 1987)). The
court further noted that transfer of liability to the BLDTF from a responsible operator, simply because
the DOL failed to name the correct responsible operator when it first processed the claim, is contrary
to congressional intent that the BLDTF be liable for the payment of benefits only where no responsible
operator can be identified. Id.
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the proper chargeable operator. Employers have been successful in
convincing some administrative law judges to dismiss secondary re-
sponsible operators before these claims proceed to hearing. When
these motions to dismiss are not successful, it is not uncommon for
the secondary operators to find it necessary to have the miner ex-
amined by a physician of their choice. As a result, miners are often
forced to undergo multiple examinations and tests because secondary
responsible operators feel compelled to develop evidence to protect
their interests. It remains to be seen whether the BRB will apply
the Oglebay Norton Co. decision outside of the Sixth Circuit.
B. Multiple Claims
1. General Rules and Recent Developments
Large numbers of miners and survivors whose initial claims were
denied continue to seek benefits by either filing a new claim 27 with
DOL or filing a petition for modification with the appropriate ad-
judicator. The handling of these claims has proven consistently trou-
blesome, and the difficulties they generate remain largely unresolved.
Section 22 of the Longshore Act' 28 provides for the right of any
party to seek modification of a prior claim award or denial. In
previously denied claims, a right to modification is available if the
request is filed within one year after the date on which the claim
was denied. 29 It is the BRB's position that any action taken by a
claimant within one year from the date of a prior denial, which
action evidences an intent to reopen or pursue a claim, shall be
construed as a request for modification. 130 Accordingly, a new claim
application submitted within the modification period is not treated
127. In fiscal year 1989, approximately one-third of the claims filed were refilings by previously
denied claimants (excluding claims filed by survivors of miners with previously awarded claims). U.S.
DEP'T oF L~AoR MorrmY FiscAL YEAR To DATE SumoARY (Sept. 1989).
128. 33 U.S.C. § 922 (1982) incorporated by reference into 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1982).
129. 20 C.F.R. § 725.310 (1989). The BRB has held that the modification period begins to run
anew after each denial. Garcia v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 12 Black
Lung Rep. (MB) 1-24, 1-26 (1988).
130. See Searls v. Southern Ohio Coal Co., 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-161, 1-163 n.3 (1988)
(citing Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Bergeron, 493 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1974)). This rule is being
contested in Meade v. Glamorgan Coal Co., BRB No. 88-2719 BLA (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1988).
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as a new claim, but as a request for modification. A claim appli-
cation filed more than one year after the final denial of a prior
claim is treated as a refiled or "duplicate" claim and is subject to
different DOL rules.131
There are several important distinctions between modification
procedures and the rules governing refiled or "duplicate claims."
A modification review revives the claimant's original cause of action
and may proceed if the claimant establishes either a change in con-
dition or a mistake of fact. 132 In a black lung claim, preservation
of the original cause of action is often of substantial benefit to the
claimant. This is so because the applicable medical eligibility criteria
are determined solely by the filing date of the claim. 33 Accordingly,
if the original claim was subject to the very liberal interim pre-
sumption, 134 the interim presumption is still applied in a subsequent
modification review. If, however, the claimant's renewed pursuit of
benefits cannot be processed as a request for modification, but in-
stead is treated as a new cause of action (i.e., a duplicate claim),
the revised eligibility criteria in DOL's Part 718 rules'35 are likely
to apply, even though the original claim was subject to the interim
rules. 36
Moreover, and apart from the identity of the applicable eligibility
rules, the likelihood of success in a modification review is greater
than when filing a duplicate claim. In a modification proceeding,
a claimant may secure a complete readjudication on the basis of the
evidence previously weighed and rejected, 3 7 or may supplement fa-
vorable evidence to enhance its credibility or respond to defects found
131. Modifications are handled in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 725.310 (1989). New filings not
qualifying for review as petitions for modification are handled under 20 C.F.R. § 725.309 (1989).
132. 20 C.F.R. § 725.310 (1989); see also Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Association, 390
U.S. 459, 463-64 (1968). The BRB holds that a mistake of law or a change in applicable law does
not satisfy the statutory predicate for readjudication under a modification theory. Donadi v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 12 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-166, 1-167 (1989); aff'd
on reh'g, 13 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-24, 1-27 (1989).
133. 20 C.F.R. § 718.2 (1989).
134. Id. at § 727.203.
135. Id. at §§ 718.1-.404.
136. Spese v. Peabody Coal Co., 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-174, 1-177 (1988); see also Tonelli
v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 878 F.2d 1083, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 1989).
137. O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-General Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 255 (1971).
[Vol. 92
26
West Virginia Law eview, Vol. 92, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/3
BLACK LUNG UPDATE
by the original fact-finder. If, for example, the claimant is fortunate
enough to have his modification proceeding heard by a more fa-
vorably inclined administrative law judge, there is the possibility that
an award may be made on the same evidence found inadequate in
the first review.
By contrast, a duplicate claim may pass the threshold test for
adjudication only if the miner proves that there has been a "material
change in conditions.' '138 The waiver of res judicata contained in
the duplicate claim regulations is, therefore, substantially restricted
in contrast to the waiver afforded in a modification proceeding. 139
Further, it may be assumed as a matter of construction that the
phrase "change in conditions" in section 725.310 (modification) im-
poses a less onerous test than the phrase "material change in con-
ditions" in section 725.309 (duplicate claim).14°
2. Update On Lukman
In Lukman v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams 41 the BRB held that only a DOL deputy commissioner has
de novo jurisdiction to determine whether a refiler's new submission
of evidence establishes a material change in conditions under section
725.309. According to the BRB's reading of the duplicate claim reg-
ulation, there is no right to a hearing before an administrative law
judge on the issue of whether a material change in conditions has
been proven; a dissatisfied claimant's only relief is a direct appeal
to the BRB."42 The BRB holding in Lukman was reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in February 1990.141 Re-
sponding to the Tenth Circuit's decision, the BRB issued an en banc
138. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(c),(d) (1989); Spese, 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) at 1-176.
139. The decision of the Supreme Court in Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414, 424
(1988), suggests also that the limited waiver of res judicata for refilers must be strictly construed in
accordance with the plain language of 20 C.F.R. § 725.309 (1989).
140. This conclusion may not hold under careful scrutiny, and has not yet been thoroughly tested
in litigation.
141. 10 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-56 (1987), aff'd on reh'g, 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-71
(1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1990).
142. See Prunty and Solomons, supra note 1, at 722-24.
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order announcing that it would follow the Tenth Circuit's ruling in
all judicial circuits. 144 Several thousand claims are affected by Luk-
man and many of those remain pending at the BRB.
Although the BRB's theory in Lukman reflected a good faith
effort to dispose of largely frivolous refilings in an administratively
convenient fashion, the approach clearly deprived the refiler of the
right to an impartial de novo hearing before an administrative law
judge. While the hearing in many refiled claims is a waste of energy,
the right to a rehearing is so fundamental that the BRB's concern
for administrative convenience was easily overcome.
The beginning of the end for the Lukman rule was plainly stated
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Pyro
Mining Co. v. Slaton. 45 Pyro Mining Co. involved a holding by the
BRB that admimstrative law judges lack jurisdiction to review a
deputy commissioner's decision to hold an employer in default for
failure to respond in a timely fashion to an initial notice of a miner's
claim. The employer and its insurer in Pyro Mining Co. claimed
that their untimely response to a claim should be excused for good
cause. After this plea was rejected by the deputy commissioner, a
de novo hearing was requested. The administrative law judge agreed
that good cause was established and accepted the employer's late
controversion.
46
On appeal, the BRB held that the deputy commissioner had ex-
clusive jurisdiction to determine the timeliness of an employer's con-
troversion, so the matter presented was not subject to review, de
novo or otherwise, by an administrative law judge. 147 Pointing to
the Longshore Act 48 and the Secretary of Labor's regulations guar-
anteeing all parties the right to a de novo hearing on all contested
144. Dotson v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, No. 88-2541 BLA (Ben.
Rev. Bd. 1990) (en banc).
145. 879 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1989).
146. Id. at 188.
147. Slaton v. Pyro Mining Co., 8 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-39 (1985), rev'd sub nom., Warner
Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 804 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1986);
reh'g Slayton v. Pyro Mining Co., 12 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-100 (1988), rev'd, 879 F.2d 187 (6th
Cir. 1989).
148. 33 U.S.C. § 919(c),(d) (1982) incorporated by reference into 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1982).
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issues of law or fact, 149 the Sixth Circuit reversed the BRB. The
Sixth Circuit held that a de novo hearing shall not be denied when
a timely request for a hearing is made by any party. 150 The decision
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Pearce v. Di-
rector, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs51 is fundamen-
tally in accord.
3. Petitions for Modification
The right to seek modification derives from section 22 of the
Longshore Act. 52 Originally, modification could be sought only upon
proof of a change in conditions, 5 but amendments in 1934 added
"a mistake in a determination of fact" to the available bases upon
which modification might be sought. 154 This additional ground was
added by Congress to permit the deputy commissioner "to render
justice under the act. '1 55
Many state workers' compensation laws authorize an adminis-
trative reopening of claims to accommodate changed conditions, ex-
cusable oversight, a deterioration or improvement in a workers'
health, or otherwise in the interest of justice. 56 Under the Black
Lung Act, the modification remedy has been employed for less sal-
utary purposes. For example, DOL has regularly asserted the mod-
ification procedures in order to correct its administrative errors or
oversights, or seek the relitigation of legal questions where the agency
failed to prevail in the original proceedings. 57 Neither have the op-
portunities presented by modification been lost on claimants whose
claims have been denied.
149. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.450, .451, .455 (1989).
150. Pyro Mining Co., 879 F.2d at 190.
151. 647 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1981).
152. 33 U.S.C. § 922 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
153. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1437 (1927).
154. See O'Keeffe v. Aerojet General Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 255 (1971).
155. S. REP. No. 588, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1244, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1934).
156. A. LARSON, THE LAw oF WoRM~A's COMPENSATION 81.00-81.50 (1989).
157. See, e.g., Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 860
F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1988); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Peabody Coal
Co., 837 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1988); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Drummond
Coal Co., 831 F.2d 240 (lth Cir. 1987).
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As noted previously, 58 modification is a particularly significant
remedy if the claim was originally filed prior to expiration of the
interim presumption. In this setting, a claimant may continue to
seek modification of repeated denials while he or she continues to
work in the mines or until more favorable medical evidence is ob-
tained. Since respiratory functions deteriorate naturally as a person
ages, 159 and the interim presumption does not account for this fairly
significant factor, 16' this strategy can benefit the claimant by pre-
senting a picture of apparently deteriorating health as repeated mod-
ifications slowly pass through the adjudicatory system. Additionally,
the liberalization of current entitlement criteria by the appellate
courts16' also provides incentive to keep a claim alive through re-
peated modification requests. 62
Many previously denied claimants are engaged in the pursuit of
second or third petitions for modification, and it is anticipated that
these efforts will produce considerable litigation in years to come.
C. Attorneys' Fees
The alleged unavailability of competent counsel to represent fed-
eral black lung claimants is a matter of continuing concern and
controversy. Although Part 718 eligibility criteria have been liber-
alized by recent judicial decisions,1 63 it is still often stated by plain-
tiffs' attorneys in coal mining regions that the representation of
158. See supra notes 132-140 and accompanying text.
159. See Miller, PULMONARY FUNCTION TESTS IN CLINICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LUNO DISEASE,
39-40 (1986).
160. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 705-06. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(2) (1989)
(interim presumption invocation values for ventilatory tests not adjusted for age) with 20 C.F.R. Part
718, app. B (permanent criteria adjusted to reflect the significance of aging).
161. See supra notes 10-75 and accompanying text.
162. There is some question whether a new legal theory of eligibility or misjudgments by clai-
mant's counsel will support a modification claim. In Longshore Act cases, the courts have generally
held that these reasons cannot sustain a petition for modification. See Verderane v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 772 F.2d 775, 780 (lth Cir. 1985); American Bridge Div., United States Steel Corp.
v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 679 F.2d 81, 83 n.6 (5th Cir. 1982); General Dynamics
Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 673 F.2d 23, 26 (Ist Cir. 1982). No
similar limitation has been announced in black lung claims and, as a practical matter, the BRB and
circuit courts in black lung claims generally apply the law in effect at the time of adjudication.
163. See supra notes 43-75 and accompanying text.
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black lung claimants is more trouble than it is worth. On the other
hand, DOL has reported that a study of recent administrative law
judges' decisions revealed "that in 92% of cases resulting in an
award or denial of benefits, the claimants had attorneys.'
164
The availability of counsel for claimants is now, and always has
been, dictated to a great extent by considerations of just compen-
sation for the attorneys. When benefit awards were easily obtained
and the black lung plaintiffs' bar prospered, Congress expressed
concern that claimants' attorneys were reaping windfall fees for very
little work. Legislative proposals were introduced to restrict the
availability of federal benefits for the payment of fees to claimants'
attorneys.'
61
Circumstances today have changed. The representation of clai-
mant's has become much less attractive because of more restrictive
eligibility criteria, increased involvement of mine operators in claims
litigation, the relatively slow pace of adjudications and a declining
volume of filings, DOL's policies barring the award of a fee in
denied claims, 166 and regulations invalidating contingent fee con-
tracts.1 67 Under current circumstances, it is not possible for a clai-
mant's representative to make up for the lost volume of black lung
cases by unilaterally increasing the amount of fee awards or finding
new bases for fee compensation. It is true, therefore, that many
attorneys who previously did this work will no longer accept new
cases, while others, who might have done so in the past, do not
enter the market.
164. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, No. 88-1671,
at 10 (U.S. 1989). The same study also noted that an award was two and one-half times more likely
if the claimant was represented by counsel. This may reflect the proposition that attorneys refuse
weaker cases, but is also due, in some degree, to the probability that a represented claimant is more
likely to prevail than a pro se claimant. In the authors' experience, fewer claimants are represented
by counsel today than was the case during the early 1980s.
165. H.R. 8835, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); H.R. 8838, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see also
Black Lung Amendments of 1973: Hearings on H.R. 3476, H.R. 8834, H.R. 8835 and H.R. 8838
before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House of Representatives Comm. on Education and
Labor, 93d Cong., Ist and 2d Sess. (1973-74).
166. The policy was recently restated by the BRB. See Broughton v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, 13 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-35, 1-36 (1989).
167. 20 C.F.R. § 725.365 (1989).
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It is difficult to quantify the significance of these developments.
If DOL data are correct, there appears to be no change in the rep-
resentation of claimants before administrative law judges.'68 Not even
anecdotal evidence has been advanced to demonstrate that worthy
claims go uncompensated for lack of willing counsel. There is no
doubt, however, that a claimant is more likely to prevail before an
administrative law judge if the claimant is represented by counsel-
partly because of the complexity of the law and regulations, and
partly because of counsel's superior access to sources of evidence.
Many claimants who are represented before the Office of Ad-
ministrative Law Judges are abandoned by their counsel if the claim
is denied and an appeal to the BRB is pursued. The majority of
pro se claimants are probably better off without counsel in BRB
proceedings. In an appeal where the claimant is represented by coun-
sel, the BRB will consider only those issues raised by counsel in
briefing. 69 In a pro se appeal, the BRB's experienced legal staff will
review the judge's decision and the record and will act to correct
any error of fact or law (procedural or substantive) that can be
identified. 170 The claimant is not even required to file a pleading to
obtain such a review.' 7' The claimant is disadvantaged in this setting
only when success in the appeal must turn upon the making of new
law or modification of existing precedent. By contrast, in the courts
of appeals, a pro se claimant/appellant is seriously handicapped by
the lack of counsel.
168. An informal study conducted by the DOL Solicitor's Office in 1975 showed that eleven
percent of claimants were unrepresented in administrative law judge proceedings at that time. Compare
this with the recent study showing that in 92o of claims resulting in an award or denial by an ALJ,
the claimant was represented by counsel. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Arguably, a
represented claimant is more likely to proceed to the administrative law judge level than is an un-
represented claimant, but this assumption cannot be validated. Those claims which are denied by a
deputy commissioner are likely to be weak and may have been denied previously (i.e., duplicate claims).
These are the types of cases that attorneys are least likely to accept because these cases are the ones
least likely to produce a benefit award and thus a fee award for the attorney. In this fashion, the
system operates to weed out perfunctory or highly questionable claims and minimize the impact of
such claims on the adjudicatory system.
169. See Sarf v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 10 Black Lung Rep.
(MB) 1-119, 1-121 (1987); Slinker v. Peabody Coal Co., 6 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-465, 1-466 (1983).
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Whatever the situation may be, the impetus for change is on the
horizon. The event most likely to subject DOL policies to careful
scrutiny is the Supreme Court's decision in United States Dep't of
Labor v. Triplett.72 In Triplett, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals dismissed disciplinary charges brought by the Committee
on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar against an attorney
who received, without approval, contingent fees from claimants in
successful federal claims .7A divided panel held that the disciplinary
charges could not be sustained because the "system" for awarding
fees to claimants' attorneys in the federal program denied claimants
their right to adequate representation by counsel and thereby de-
prived claimants of their property without due process of law. 174 In
essence, the West Virginia court permitted Triplett to assert the rights
of black lung claimants in defense of the disciplinary charges. Find-
ing the federal black lung attorney fee system unconstitutional, the
West Virginia court reasoned that Triplett could not be disciplined
for failure to follow its governing rules.
175
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the West Virginia court. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
observed that the record was totally inadequate to prove that claim-
ants could not obtain adequate representation or that any such in-
ability was caused by DOL's "system. 1 1 76 The disposition of this
case will certainly focus attention on the issue, and this attention
may produce some alterations which will make the representation
of claimants more attractive.1
77
172. Committee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d 82 (W.Va.
1988), rev'd sub nom. United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 58 U.S.L.W. 4389 (1990); see Prunty
& Solomons, supra note 1, at 726-27.
173. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 95. The Committee on Legal Ethics also filed a petition for certiorari
that was granted and consolidated with the DOL appeal. United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett,
110 S. Ct. 48 (1989).
174. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 93.
175. Id. at 95.
176. Triplett, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4390-91. In a separate opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan, noted that if a case could be made on these accounts, a Constitutional challenge might
succeed. Id. at 4393-94 (Marshall, J., concurring).
177. It is surprising that lawyers representing black lung claimants have not directly challenged
DOL's prohibition against fee awards in losing cases, or the rule absolutely invalidating contingent
fee arrangements. It is not beyond possibility that the courts of appeals would be receptive to such
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D. DOL As A Collection Agency
With its declining volume of claims, DOL has recently committed
significant resources to the collection of debts owed or allegedly
owed to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (BLDTF). Most of
the activity in this area has focused on two categories of liability:
benefit overpayments made to claimants and interest on payments
made by and previously reimbursed to the BLDTF by a miner op-
erator or its insurer.
Overpayment claims arise in several ways. As a general rule,
benefit payments in an approved claim are payable from the month
of a miner's filing, or in the case of a survivor's claim, from the
month of the miner's death or January 1, 1974, whichever is later .17
Benefits payable are, however, subject to an offset for state or fed-
eral workers' compensation awards for disability or death due to
pneumoconiosis 179 or, in certain circumstances, earnings from alter-
native employment or self-employment paid to the primary bene-
ficiary. 180 Benefit payments are also subject to adjustment in light
of a variety of changes in the status of a primary beneficiary or
benefit augmentee. 18'
Responding to congressional pressure, DOL routinely com-
menced the payment of benefits from the BLDTF within thirty days
following the first determination of a claimant's eligibility and con-
currently made a lump sum payment to the claimant reflecting all
past due benefits from the month of filing or death. 182 These pay-
ments are called "interim" payments, and are made with the ex-
challenges, nor is it clear that the statute cannot accommodate an arrangement in which the unsuc-
cessful claim defendant pays a reasonable lodestar fee and the claimant pays the rest under an approved
and fair contingent fee contract. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 110 S. Ct. 1679 (1990).
178. 20 C.F.R. § 725.503 (1989). Benefits may be paid beginning prior to the date of claim
filing, but no earlier than January 1, 1974, if the evidence establishes the onset of total disability
prior to the date of filing. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Rochester
& Pittsburgh Coal Co., 678 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1982); Kuhar v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 5 Black Lung
Rep. (MB) 1-765 (1983).
179. 20 C.F.R. § 725.533 (1989).
180. Id. § 725.536.
181. Id. §§ 725.201-.233, 725.533.
182. See id. § 725.522. The lump sum payment of retroactive benefits was ended by the 1981
amendments. Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119 § 103(a), 95 Stat. 1636
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9501 (1982)).
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pectation that they will be recovered from the responsible mine
operator or insurer after a final determination of eligibility.
DOL procedures leading to an initial award are often ex parte.
If the mine operator, after having the opportunity to defend the
claim, ultimately prevails in establishing the claimant's ineligibility,
the BLDTF is left with a substantial overpayment. In other cases,
eligible claimants fail to timely report benefit awards under state
programs or changes in the status of an augmentee and are over-
compensated for some discrete period of time. Such payments are
also deemed overpayments. 83
DOL is authorized to collect overpayments from claimants by
either reducing future payments 8 4 or, if no future payments are due,
by recouping overpaid amounts in an administrative action brought
against a claimant. 8 5 DOL must waive overpaid amounts if specified
criteria are established. 86
During the last few years, DOL has embarked upon an aggressive
effort to recoup overpayments. In most cases, claimants were no-
tified in writing that "interim" payments made to them prior to
final adjudication would have to be repaid if their claim was ul-
timately denied. A finally denied claimant who did not heed, or who
was unable to heed the repayment warning, may be faced with sub-
stantial overpayment liabilities. 187 While many claimants may be
judgment proof, DOL apparently believes that many are able to
make repayment. The ongoing collection effort by DOL, and to a
lesser extent coal mine operators and their insurers, has produced
considerable litigation involving: 1) claims for recovery, and 2) ad-
ditional refilings and requests for modification in order to forestall
recovery efforts.
183. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.540(a) (1989).
184. Id. § 725.540(c).
185. Id. § 725.544.
186. Id. §§ 725.541-.543. A mine operator seeking the recovery of an overpayment is not similarly
required to waive its right to recovery. Id. § 725.547.
187. Overpaid amounts that are waived by DOL or an operator may be construed by the Internal
Revenue Service to be reportable and taxable as ordinary income. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (1982).
Properly paid benefits are exempt from federal income taxes. See 30 U.S.C. § 922(c) (1982).
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DOL's efforts to recover interest payments from operators and
insurers are also vigorously pursued. In monthly benefit claims, it
is often the case that the employer or carrier waited until the issuance
of a final determination of the claimants' eligibility to directly com-
mence monthly benefit payments and/or reimburse the BLDTF for
back benefits paid. In these circumstances interest will usually be
awarded by the administrative law judge in favor of the BLDTF,
and the award of interest is final and binding. s8
The employer's liability for interest on indemnity benefits is well
settled by statute and causes little litigation except when DOL waits
too long to commence recovery efforts. Although the issue has not
yet been decided by the BRB or a circuit court, it appears that the
Black Lung Act imposes a six year statute of limitations on DOL's
recovery efforts and that this statute of limitation begins to run on
the date on which the operator's liability is finally determined.'89
DOL is also attempting to collect interest on medical benefits
paid by the BLTDF and reimbursed by a mine operator. These ef-
forts have already produced considerable litigation.' 9° These cases
typically arise in claims for "medical benefits only" (MBO claims)
filed by a miner also entitled to receive indemnity benefits from the
Social Security Administration under Part B of the Act.' 9' In these
cases, entitlement to covered health care benefits is determined in
a two step process. First, a medical benefits claimant must establish
entitlement to monthly indemnity benefits, even though no money
is actually payable on such entitlement. The right to receive health
care benefits under the black lung program is fixed if the miner first
proves total disability due to pneumoconiosis in accordance with the
188. 20 C.F.R. § 725.608 (1989). The rate of interest charged is established by statute and varies
from year to year. Id. § 725.608(c). Prejudgment interest is prohibited in black lung claims. See, e.g.,
Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds,
Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135 (1987).
189. 30 U.S.C. § 424(b)(4)(B) (1982); 20 C.F.R. § 725.603(d) (1989). This issue is currently
pending before the BRB in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Carbon Fuel,
No. 89-3351 BLA (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1989).
190. Several cases have been consolidated for review by the Office of Administrative Law Judges.
Bailey v. Island Creek Coal Co., No. 89-1779 BLA (1989).
191. See discussion in Prunty & Solomons, supra note 1, at 728-33.
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eligibility rules contained in the interim presumption. 19 2 Then, if and
when medical care is provided for the treatment of the miner's pneu-
moconiosis, billings for this care are submitted to DOL or the mine
operator, either of which has the right to contest particular bills on
one or more of several grounds (e.g., the treatment was not rea-
sonable or necessary, or the treatment was not for pneumoconio-
sis).' 9
3
Most MBO claims were filed between 1978 and 1981. Again
bending to political pressure, DOL simply entered an ex parte award
in every claim filed without validating or adjudicating the original
SSA entitlement determination. 194 At this point, DOL commenced
the payment of medical bills and later notified a mine operator or
insurer of its potential liability. Because no specific liability attached
to the finding of basic entitlement and because employers could
contest individual billings, many operators and carriers conceded
first stage liability. After this concession of liability DOL was ob-
ligated to terminate interim medical benefit payments made from
the BLDTF and redirect the providers to the operator or carrier for
payment. At the sdme time, DOL would seek reimbursement for
the billings it had already paid. Operators and carriers would not,
however, reimburse the BLDTF without first having an opportunity
to audit the bills.
DOL often informed willing operators and carriers that copies
of the medical bills paid by the BLDTF, and supporting documen-
tation, could not be promptly provided. The bills paid by the BLDTF
could not be promptly provided because DOL did not operate the
medical bill payment system but instead contracted it to various non-
governmental third parties. This system has produced enormous in-
efficiencies, and operators have often waited five years or more to
receive proof of their health care liabilities from DOL.
Although each medical bill for which DOL seeks reimbursement
is, in effect, a separate claim for benefits subject to dispute and
192. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701A (1989); see also Lute v. Split Vein Coal Co., 11 Black Lung Rep.
(MB) 1-82 (1987).
193. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701A (1989).
194. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.701A(a)(2) (1989).
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litigation, it is common that no good defense is reasonably possible
because of the significant delays between the time treatment was
rendered and paid for by the BLDTF and the operator's first op-
portunity to see the billings. t95 In fact, many miners are deceased
by the time bills and documentation are submitted by DOL to the
employer or insurer.
Handicapped as they were by DOL's treatment of these mat-
ters, 96 and because of an initial reluctance to interfere in the de-
terminations of treating physicians, employers and carriers commonly
paid without dispute whatever DOL billed. (This practice has waned
in recent years.) In the majority of cases, medical benefit billings
paid by the BLDTF were paid within thirty days from the receipt
of copies of the billing invoices; that is, from the operator's or
carrier's point of view, within thirty days of notice of the claim. 197
Recently, DOL has assessed against operators and insurers pre-
judgment interest from the date the medical bills were paid by the
BLDTF. Because bills often date back to the late 1970s, the interest
claimed by DOL may be fairly significant, especially if the miner
was in the throes of a terminal or serious illness requiring extensive
medical attention. In many instances, employers and insurers are
refusing to pay the prejudgment interest. These cases will be litigated
over the next several years.
DOL's role as a collection agency will likely continue. In fiscal
year 1989, revenues received by the BLDTF slightly exceeded all
195. The Longshore Act requires prior notice of treatment to the employer, the filing of relevant
treatment reports by the provider, and affords the employer the right to decline approval on appro-
priate grounds. 33 U.S.C. § 907 (1982), incorporated by reference into 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1982);
20 C.F.R. §§ 725.705-.706 (1989). DOL has routinely, if not invariably, ignored this statute and its
own rules in this regard, further complicating the agency's efforts to obtain recovery.
196. DOL's contractors, by all appearances, made no real effort to audit or control billings.
Several health care providers took advantage of this uncontrolled and non-cost contained system, and
some of these providers have been investigated, indicted and convicted of criminal activity in this
connection. The lack of any reasonable cost or quality control has made black lung billing of health
care costs a most attractive alternative for less than honest providers.
197. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.412-.413 (1989). In the vast majority of cases, the original award of
medical benefits did not also direct the payment of interest on medical billings. In the absence of a
determination of such liability at the appropriate time, there is some question concerning the appli-
cability of the six year statute of limitations on the pursuit of a debt owed to the BLDTF.
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payouts.98 At the same time, however, the BLDTF continues to
carry a $3.05 billion indebtedness to the United States Treasury, and
this debt will again accrue interest in 1991.199 So long as this debt
pressure remains (it will surely remain well into the twenty-first cen-
tury), DOL will continue to pursue all arguable sources of revenue.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal black lung program continues to evolve. The volume
of filings is in decline, the frequency of awards has declined since
the days of the interim presumption, and the huge volume of claims
litigation experienced in the 1980s will not be repeated. The program
is by no means over, but it is shrinking.
While the courts of appeals have recently acted to significantly
improve a claimant's prospects for obtaining benefits under the per-
manent medical criteria, and while there will be more opportunities
to continue moving in this direction on the margins of DOL's el-
igibility rules, the program can no longer be viewed as an economic
aid program for mining communities or as a federal entitlement
vehicle for retired miners and their families.
20
For years, the program has served as a source of employment
for countless doctors, lawyers, government employees and others,
but this too is becoming a thing of the past. It is hoped that what
will emerge from the program's evolution is a better and more just
system where all arguably deserving black lung victims are properly
and promptly compensated by their employers without unnecessary
litigation. Such a system would be in keeping with the salutary prin-
ciples of workers' compensation law. In keeping with this vision,
persons who have no legitimate claims will not file, and lawyers,
on all sides, will abandon the gamesmanship that has characterized
federal black lung litigation for years.
198. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR STATUS OF FUNDS REPORT (1989).
199. Id.; see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10-503,
101 Stat. 1330-446 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 4121).
200. See 127 CONG. REc. 31,977-98 (Dec. 16, 1981) (statement of Sen. Hatch); P. BAiR, supra
note 79, at 275-84; J. NELSON, supra note 79, at 154-57.
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Perhaps this vision naively ignores the "real politic" of the fed-
eral black lung program, and perhaps it erroneously assumes that
the currently dormant political forces which shaped the program in
the past will not be reactivated. But whatever happens, the authors
believe that this vision is attainable and that it would be a just
conclusion to the rocky history of the federal black lung program.
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